Castell’s notion of the ‘dual city’ is in general terms based on a considerable body of evidence. Manufacturing jobs have been lost in urban areas, creating insecure and low paid jobs primarily in the service sector; and the ‘rolling back’ of the state in the neo-liberal economic agenda has led to both spatial and structural polarisation in urban areas. However, different forms of housing provisions and labour market regulations account for a range of different structural and spatial outcomes in different nation states. In addition, seen bottom-up, personal and family based space-time budgets connected to possibilities in intra-urban movements and obligations in social reproduction influence segregation tendencies. The NEHOM project including 29 case studies in 8 European countries present a number of examples of local and national policies which lead to a re-evaluation of the ‘dual city model’. The paper draws on comparative work done in Hungary, Norway and the UK.

THE ‘DUAL CITY’ THEORY.

Three concepts have been closely linked in urban theories in the 1990s: global city; dual city; and social polarisation. In Scandinavia the concept ‘segregation’ has been the focus rather than ‘social polarisation’. The ideas were based on empirical evidence from New York and Los Angeles and extended to major Western cities and finally transferred down the whole urban hierarchy (Wessel 2000). Manuel Castells and Saskia Sassen indicated that observed patterns in New York and Los Angeles could be generalised to global cities. Castells, (1989 p. 343) anticipating increasing labour differentiation and ‘new urban dualism’ set forward the conclusion that the global city is also the dual city. Sassen (1991) came to the same conclusion, but introduced the term ‘social polarisation’ as a strong signifier.

The basis for the dual city development is two sets of interlinked processes:

- the absolute decline, or relative movement from the city of manufacturing industries. They have to a large extent been relocated to cheaper premises in the regions or in other countries (Third World, Eastern Europe). Manufacturing jobs have been lost in urban areas, whereas well paid jobs relying on highly specialised skills have been developed in the new information, research and business sectors. It is seldom possible to replace more than a small portion of those made redundant in the manufacturing sector. Those re-employed are commonly on lower wages with less secure conditions
in low-level servicing jobs as cleaners, security guards etc. The changes in the manufacturing industry is thus both structural and spatial.

- The ‘rolling back of the state’, that is the influence by neo-liberal economic political trends; leading governments to aspire to minimal state expenditures. This has led to reduction of public services, undermining of labour unions bargaining power, transformation of the labour market to individual, so called flexible and part-time working contracts.

Castells argues that these socio-economic processes interlock to produce two types of outcomes: the structural and the spatial (Jarvis et. al 2001). The structural processes lead to development of an ‘hour-glass’ society (Liepietz 1998) in which the richer get richer, the poorer more poor and the middle classes are shrinking. The highly paid professionals are supported by an army of low-level service jobs, which, however, is often filled by economic immigrants rather than by those becoming redundant in the manufacturing industries. This leads on to an increasing number of long time unemployed. ‘Social polarisation’ is thus seen as a direct product of economic restructuring.

Structural dualism leads at the same time to spatial segregation and to spatial segmentation, to sharp differentiation between the upper level of the information society and the rest of the local residents as well as to endless segmentation and frequent opposition among the many components of restructured and destructured labour (Castells 1989 p 227).

Looking at the internal geographical structures of urban areas we often find a segmentation of economic exclusion in working class neighbourhoods close to and now closed down, manufacturing industries. In the Ruhr region almost as many new jobs have been created for those lost in the heavy industrial sector. The new jobs have opened up varied opportunities for the well educated and for females, whereas elderly male blue collar workers are transferred to permanent unemployment. A particular group of losers are the many ‘Gastarbeiter’, mainly Turkish, who came in the 1970s and live in certain neighbourhoods, often tenements owned by the former heavy industry companies (Harnhörster 2000). Women, and young, second generation immigrants in these families are culturally handicapped in the new, growing job market. In middle-class neighbourhoods nearby, two-income families are typical (Holt-Jensen 2000).

Both Jarvis et al (2001) and Wessel (2000) point, however, out that the logic in the theory regarding spatial patterning is not clear. Castells is able to provide ‘a big picture’, but as in any ‘grand theory’ it has weaknesses and a number of individual experiences contradict it.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE ‘DUAL CITY THEORY’: ‘THE SECRET LIFE OF CITIES’ OR TIME-SPACE CONSTRAINTS OF ROUTINE ACTIONS.

Giddens’s structuration theory (1984), by which structures are created and transformed through routine interactions of people, makes structures not only constraining, but also enabling. This means that we are not caught in the “necessities of the socio-economic processes” in the ‘global cities’. “Different forms of housing provision and labour market regulation account for a range of structural and spatial outcomes in different nation states” points out Jarvis et al (2001 p. 36). They maintain that whereas Giddens’s theories mainly have been connected to structuration in relation to class and social structure, they can as well be applied to labour and housing market structures and institutions. Giddens points out that institutions also have a spatial dimension; their spatial extent may be referred to as locale. Giddens draws upon Hägerstrand’s (1975) and partners (Carlstein et al 1978) work on time-geography to develop his notion of distanciation, the stretching of social interaction across time and space. As it is physically impossible to be in more than one place at one time, this limits each individuals choices in routine daily life, in choices of housing and work, in transport decisions and in what Jarvis et al (2001) call ‘social reproduction’. ‘The secret life of cities’ may be seen as a metaphor for the practical way of coping in daily life by the thousands of individuals in family situations, formalised in routine actions which make and remake city structures. The secret life of cities cannot be readily understood through any ‘grand theory’, but on the basis of bottom-up investigations of individual choice. This means that networks and institutions are outcomes, and not starting points; they are constituted through the practice of everyday life in the city. (Jarvis et al 2001 p. 42). Through a number of investigations, using long interviews with individuals in family situations, mainly in London, but also in other British cities, Jarvis et al (2001) comes to conclusions which give interesting new perspectives on the ‘dual city theory’.

The action space of individuals in London are constrained by a number of general and special factors. In accordance with the dual city theory there has been a shake-out of manufacturing jobs and at the same time a spill-over of service jobs. Whereas there is a structural caused unemployment in parts of the conurbation and of the population, London has 20 % of the jobs in Great Britain, but only 12 % of the population; in statistical terms then an undersupply of labour. But: there is a serious mismatch between job opportunities and local labour markets, including concentration of high-skilled jobs in Central London and increasing number of low-skilled jobs in Outer London. This is creating a growing need to travel longer distances to work, mainly because the housing market is segmented, particularly with respect to tenure.

“Private-sector provision is dominant in Outer/west London and social housing heavily concentrated in the Inner/east zones. Some 20 to 30 years ago, London’s housing and employment structures used to be very close to each other in space and time.” (Jarvis et al 2001 p. 49)

Today there are both quantitative and qualitative mismatches between housing and employment structures in London and this makes movement an essential part of urban life.
The mismatch creates strong constraints on daily life for those which do not have equal access to mobility: the poor, the unemployed, the disabled, elderly, women and children. The choices in the routinised time-space budget is strictly limited by transport availability and costs. Both housing and transport structures are rather rigid and not possible to change as fast as the labour markets changes. This is creating a growing inequality between mobile and trapped sectors of the population.

Transport links between home and workplace is, however, only one simple aspect of the daily time-space budget. Jarvis et al (2001) use the term ‘social reproduction’ for all activities in daily life which is not covered by home-work relationships. One activity is shopping in which increasingly the best bargains are mainly accessible for those with a private car and credit card and who finds the out-of-town new shopping malls covering their needs. Those less mobile and creditworthy are confined to local shopping with less choice and higher prices. Other parts of social reproduction are related to school and kindergarten attendance for children; activities connected to memberships in organisations and clubs; attendance in leisure and entertainment activities. Changing forms of social life and family structures also greatly influences the ‘secret life of cities’; the core family is no longer in dominant number, singles, cohabitants without children etc. make up an increasing portion of the urban households. And their housing and recreation preferences are different from ‘core families’. Singles and young couples tend to prefer central city housing location to be close to the entertainment facilities, we also register that pensioners which have long lives and often decent economy tends to move back to central city housing. The ‘core family’ choice is on the other hand suburban living, but not all can afford that or, perhaps due to ‘time-space’ budget logistics find it better to find housing close to the workplace of one partner. These factors may be as influential in the socio-spatial structure of the cities as the changing industrial structures in the global cities.

This is because all the activity needs of the different households create strains on everyday life decisions which collectively make up the secret life of cities. Two kinds of household decisions are crucial to the co-ordination of everyday life and time-space budgets:

- ‘material household decisions’ such as changing of jobs, moving home, getting married, having children etc., decisions which are done rather seldom, but which have a profound impact.

- ‘Routinised daily practices’ connected to commuting to work, shopping, escorting children to school or kindergarten, leisure time activities etc.

These decisions are at the core of peoples lives and coping in the city; and they can as well be seen as the agency that mediates between the structural changes in the labour market of the global cities and its social urban geography. There is no direct line of cause and effect here, in contradiction to what may be interpreted from ‘the dual city theory’. The decisions are as well mediations of other structures, some rather rigid and slowly changing as the housing market and the transport network, others more dynamic such as changing family structures, double earning households having become the rule. To cope in the global city, getting decent housing and good upbringing for children, a ‘core family’ needs two incomes. Flexible working hours, particularly in low paid service jobs often dominated by female workers, gives both more options for time-space budgets but also more scope for argument and disagreement. There is clear evidence that flexible work makes workers’ daily life more
complex and fragmented: if there are two workers in a family it is increasingly getting more
difficult to assemble the whole household for dinners and breakfasts together. In the material
household decisions as well as in routine daily practices “people are locked into coordination
problems of other members of their households” (Jarvis et al 2001 p.152).

A lot of stress and conflicts in family life are results of such coordination problems; often
resulting in broken marriages. And after a broken marriage, solving of new time-space and
economic budgets are needed, often leading to quite new solutions of housing location. The
material household decision of acquiring a house or apartment may not be directly related to
affordability, but is often a reflection of housing location in relation to the workplace of one
of the family members. Often a home is located close to the female’s workplace whereas the
husband is commuting over longer distances. Housing choice may also be dependent on
family ties in locations where for instance grand-parents can take a hand in child-care, or
where there is good schooling.

To cope in this complex web of city life requires substantial economic and social resources;
not only in managing budgets, but also in simple time-management. A lot of people are
locked out of jobs simply because they do not have possibility of transport from home to
work places, and they are not able to move because they do not have the possibility to get
housing where the jobs are. Living in a city where mobility and flexibility are key requires in
many cases too much of those made redundant in the traditional labour market or those
excluded from schools. Most high unemployment areas in the larger cities are relatively close
to areas of labour demand; however, getting from home to work is not a simple issue.

“The narratives that we hear expounded about globalisation and global cities by writers such
as Sassen and Castells apply within the city as well as between it and others. The islands of
exclusion are next to the citadels of success and excess. However, those socially excluded
have smaller and physically limited access to resources. ‘Being there’ is an everyday
struggle.’ (Jarvis et al 2001 p. 158)

On the other hand we find the world citizens that have few problems in ‘being anywhere’, but
this may overshadow the fact that in all households there are individual differences in possible
action space, cleavages based on gender and age.

In relation to the dual-city theory the main message here is that the structures forming city life
through modifications by agency are much more complex; we cannot get an understanding of
the structural and particularly the spatial outcomes without a ‘bottom-up’ understanding of
family and individual time-space decisions and budgets.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE 'DUAL-CITY THEORY': EUROPEAN WELFARE SYSTEMS AND PLANNING REGULATIONS WHICH MODIFY STRUCTURAL AND SPATIAL INEQUALITIES.

“Many social problems said to be inextricably linked to global cities are contingent rather than necessary and inevitable” (Dieleman and Hamnett 1994 p. 362)

The Netherlands is presented as an example of a well-functioning welfare state, where inequalities are moderated by state intervention and political consensus-building. Hamnett (1994) argues that the Dutch Randstadt conurbation is characterized by professionalisation rather than polarisation and maintains that Sassen’s thesis of increasing polarisation is flawed in many respects. He admits that income inequalities are increasing and stronger in London than in Randstadt, but relates that to differences between UK and The Netherlands in housing and welfare policies as well as to the traditional British class system. London is in his eyes not a more global city than Randstadt.

In the Dutch welfare system, for instance access to housing is regulated and housing subsidies are important in directing where people live; the size and operation of the social rented sector is such that a social mix is expected and in most cases achieved. In Britain social housing provision, although being large in scale up till the Thatcher era, has always been labelled ‘working class’ with housing size and standards creating even finer grain of social cleavages. The ‘Right to Buy’ in the 1980 British Housing Act led to a grand scale selling out of local authority social housing to tenants and creation of new types of Housing Associations in the UK. A major result is a much smaller public housing sector, often containing the least attractive cores of former larger public estates. This of course creates pockets of deprivation which cannot be blamed on the general global city development. From a Scandinavian or Dutch political point of view it may rather be seen as an outcome of a failed housing policy.

The same can be said of the spatial consequences of American housing and welfare policies. Worsening ghetto situations cannot be blamed on the ‘global city’ trends.

We may here refer to the keynote presentation at the ENHR conference in Gävle 2000 by Professor John Goering of the University of New York on ‘How enduring is Racial Segregation and Isolation in the United States?’ Goering held forward as positive the acceptance of ethnic diversity in American upper and middle class neighbourhoods, provided the people moving in were successful in life and moving up the ladder in accordance with the ‘American dream’. The liberal Democratic government had introduced housing grants to those families in the ghettos that had social ambitions and wanted a better future for their families in middle class housing surroundings. So families with initiative could be able to move out of the ghettos. One positive result, rather obvious, was that the kids from these ethnic diverse backgrounds obtained school results at or above the average after having moved to schools and housing in better neighbourhoods. But what would be the results for the ghettos? Obviously they would be drained of ‘resource persons’, leaving only the worst situated, including drug addicts and criminals back in the ‘sink’. So here we find a deliberate US policy aiming at creating what we see happen in our European studies in a more diffuse and haphazard way. To say it rather bluntly: so far it seems that the best policy would be a
sorting out of troublesome clients and as well immigrants that may cause problems in poor
neighbourhoods and settle them deliberately and dispersed in upper and middle class housing
districts. In principle this should not really create a problem with immigrants and asylum
seekers as they in most cases are resource persons, although with different cultures and
possible constraints in their psyche from former political harassment etc. Such relocation and
mix is more of a problem with the worst social clients, such as drug addicts and criminals.

Admittedly, as Wessel (1997) points out, the potential for socio-economic and ethnic
segregation is larger in most countries than some decades ago, and this is a trend following
globalisation and the main forces exposed in the dual-city theory. But 'social polarisation' and
'segregation' at least in spatial terms are not a necessary consequences. The 'passion for
equality' is largely a common Scandinavian heritage. This is clearly exposed by Gunnar
Myrdal in his book 'American Dilemma' (1944). He points out that the residential segregation
and all connected problems of Negro housing must be broken down through social practical
research and engineering. “Gross inequality in this field is not only a matter of democratic
American conscience, but it is also expensive in the end”, (Myrdal 1944 p. 627). Today the
Afro-American ghetto is much worse than when Myrdal wrote this Up till the 1950s Harlem
and other big city ghettos were still home places for Afro-American resource persons. Today
they have moved out, both resulting in and a function of a vicious circle of deterioration in
public and private services (Marcuse 1998).

Based on the social experiences of the great depression in the 1930s and the fight against Nazi
rule during the war, the Labour Parties coming into power in Scandinavia in1945 regarded a
leading public role in economic and social policies as crucial to obtain stability. A major part
of this was the provision of decent housing for all, and as credit and building material was
limited, luxury house building became very difficult. In Norway the State Housing Bank
gave a premium and very favourable taxation, which still is in force, for those building a one-
family house with an extra apartment for renting to those less creditworthy. Particularly in
small and medium sized towns, where apartment blocks were and still are scarce, this in itself
provides a social mix. It should be noted that through the 1950s and 60s this policy was
supported by all major parties. As the Labour Parties abandoned state confiscation and
nationalisation of private industries and joined the denunciation of communism, a sense of
collective social aims and responsibilities for the whole population was embraced by all
political parties. The social consensus policy worked with only minor deviations. For a long
time the issue of residential segregation remained a non-issue as it was anticipated that
modernisation and social mobility would level out the relatively small differences through
time. This was aided by for instance a deliberate mixing of housing types within the same
school districts and the fact that the local public school was attended by more than 90 % of
the children living in a neighbourhood. Gradually as well it has become a deliberate policy to
integrate all children, including those with learning as well as social and physical handicaps
up till 10th grade in the same class. Even in High School the grading by ability is played
down.
THE NEHOM CASE STUDIES, EXAMPLES OF DEVIATIONS FROM THE DUAL-CITY MODEL.

Although somewhat weakened in later decades the housing and welfare policies of many European states contradict many features of the dual-city model. The EU financed NEHOM (Neighbourhood Housing Models) project 2000-2004, (for which the author has been scientific co-ordinator), can be said to have as a political aim to combat some of the postulated effects of the dual-city model. It is analysing housing policy and local initiatives that seem to be effective in combating social exclusion and thus social polarisation. Twenty nine case studies, in 8 European countries, of initiatives which seemed to have such positive effects was carried out in 2000 – 2001; in the next phase of the project openings and barriers for cross-national transfer of such initiatives were analysed. To analyse transferability we needed to have a very good understanding of the different national housing and social policy rules and practices. These studies in comparative politics gave us some basis to voice opinions on to what extent the dual-city model is contingent on national, not only global processes.

We should, however, note that it would not be correct to present critics of the dual-city theory singularly on the basis of evidence from the NEHOM case studies. These case studies were chosen because the processes going on in them have been found effective in combating social exclusion and thus social polarisation. These local studies therefore only function as examples or manifestations that social polarisation, social segregation and social exclusion are not necessary consequences of economic restructuring and globalisation. On the basis of national analyses and selected case studies in 3 European countries: Norway, Hungary and The UK we can try to highlight some of these differences and their effects.

HOUSING POLICIES AND LOCAL INITIATIVES AIMING AT REDUCING SEGREGATION IN NORWEGIAN CITIES.

In 1978 an empirical study (Aase & Dale 1978) documented compensation of different life standard factors and rather egalitarian social conditions in the Norwegian countryside and small towns. Later studies (Wessel 1998) have confirmed that in the countryside and in small towns there is an egalitarian and very high housing standard in Norway; it is impossible from the outer appearance of houses to tell whether the owners are blue-collar or white-collar workers, private business owners or fishermen. But the Aase & Dale (1978) study documented a level of segregation and inequalities in living standards in the bigger cities which took many politicians by surprise. These inequalities were regarded as problematic, but strategies to combat them were shaped around old formulas of economic redistribution. The issue came into the foreground again around 1990. A government report (St. meld. 11 1990-91) stated that physical separation of social groups is the principal cause of additional public expenditures in the major cities. Spatial segregation should therefore be combated. Much of the debate has been related to the traditional east-west divide in the capital Oslo, east being the poor, traditionally blue-collar worker, part. To “most commentators it is an undesirable reminder of old-fashioned class differentials” (Wessel 200 p. 1951). The issue became,
however, more complicated than a pure class based segregation, as East Oslo had become the place in which new immigrant groups, notably Pakistanis, had settled.

Some argue that ethnic segregation and concentration in parts of the city is acceptable as such communities act as supportive havens for newcomers. But the conventional wisdom, based on the Norwegian egalitarian ideal, is that ethnic segregation will reinforce the old spatial differentiation between rich and poor and will also delay the integration of immigrants into the Norwegian society. A multiracial society is more acceptable to Norwegian society than a multi-cultural one. Conservative Islamic rules denying women equal rights and young peoples freedom in choice of sexual partners are unacceptable and partly against the law.

Wessel (2000) remarks that socio-spatial polarisation and socio-economic segregation in Oslo have been pointed out as unwanted by major political parties on both the right and the left side of the political spectrum. It is a common understanding that such cleavages are increasing. To counter these supposed tendencies huge reinvestment programmes have been carried out in the inner-eastern part of Oslo. But, asks Wessel (2000), is there truly a pattern of growing inequalities? Based on substantial statistical data he concludes that there is no evidence of increasing socio-spatial polarisation in Oslo. Rehabilitation of housing in Inner East has lead to gentrification as well as multi-ethnicity. This is parallel to the development of Söder in Stockholm where there is a mixed population of immigrants catering for ethnic shops and restaurants as well as young, well educated Swedish inhabitants. Inner Oslo apartment prices have risen considerably, particularly as it is close to the town centre and very popular among young singles and couples without children. These changes are reflections of the changing household structures in modern society and the preferences for single people to live close to the city centre.

Parts of Outer East have more social problems, also related to immigrants. This is mainly related to the massive housing block estates built in the 1960s and 70s. But in the newer housing developments of the 1980s and 90s the housing structure plans are such that within the same neighbourhood there is a deliberate mix of apartment blocks, terraced housing and single family housing which invites people of different economic strata to settle next to each other.

The Norwegian NEHOM case studies have all been carried out in the second biggest city, Bergen. The Saksarhaugen case (Holt-Jensen et al 2004, based on Gustavsen 2001) analyses the situation in a neighbourhood where a more massive housing development started in the end of the 1980s. Formerly the census tract had a dispersed settlement of one-family villas along the seashore. The new housing contained a mixture of terraced housing and modern apartment blocks, the standard of all being very high. The apartment blocks and most of the new terraced housing were built as co-operative housing in which each member tenant is part-owner. Norwegian co-ops are very special as you have to pay both rent to the individual co-op you live in and pay, before moving in, c. 1/3 of the cost of your apartment as ownership share, a share you may later sell at the price the market will give for it. In accordance with the social mix ideal, the city council is also entitled by law to buy c. 10% of the shares in a co-op for
clients that are not able to buy themselves. They may also assist a family that has employment, but no security, in giving guarantees for a bank loan to buy a share; the aim being to make as many as possible owners, and thus more interested in taking part in the communal responsibilities related to a co-op. At Saksarhaugen the Bergen municipality used the 10% rule, but have been careful to move in only social clients that are able to adapt to the co-op rules. So a screening of social tenants was required. Some more problematic tenants were supplied housing in two small publicly owned housing blocks with a total of only 24 apartments. These apartments are located between co-ops and one-family housing in this neighbourhood. There have been problems with some of the clients and as in most new housing areas some tendencies to youth gangs about 10 years after the main building phase took place. Through long interviews with inhabitants however, confirmation has been confirmed that the social mix is accepted in principle by the inhabitants. The general attitude is that the children from less fortunate families should be given the opportunity to grow up in a good social and physical environment. The integration is, however, dependent on a screening of the social clients and common social work and creation of meeting places and activities. In this case both physical mix of housing types and deliberate social mix by integration of social clients in what by all outer signs is a middle-class area is definitely a good example on how social polarisation may be contradicted.

Løvstakksiden is another NEHOM case study area (Holt-Jensen et al 2004, based on Germiso 2001). It is a traditional working class district located close to the town centre on the shadow side of Mount Løvstakken and has since World War 1 carried a stigma as being relatively socially deprived. One third of the housing, particularly the older part, is privately owned, 1/3 is co-op housing and 1/3 is public housing. The public housing is 100% owned by the council and concentrated in a couple of small neighbourhoods in the area. Although only 6% of the council housing at Løvstakken is dispersed apartments in co-ops, the area still is socially mixed, although definitely more blue-collar working class than Saksarhaugen. The housing standard was at the end of the 1980s lower than in most other parts of the town, and tendencies of social stigmatisation led to the Løvstakken initiative in the 1990s. This initiative is rather complex, and can be compared to initiatives in other European neighbourhoods of relative deprivation. The public initiative combined physical rehabilitation with a number of local social initiatives. These include creation of meeting places (community houses), locally run neighbourhood committees and youth councils, and neighbourhood police. The aim of the project was also to split up a concentration of problematic social clients in the area. One housing block with small public one-room apartments, that over time had been used to house persons with criminal backgrounds, was actually demolished. This site was used for the building of an old people’s home and the clients that lived there been dispersed and taken care of in different social housing initiatives. Some of the most difficult clients have been located in a ‘house training project’ under 24-hour supervision and control. It is also a political aim to sell parts of the concentrated public housing blocks and buy new public apartments dispersed in co-ops and other housing estates in different parts of Bergen. It is seen as negative that Løvstakksiden public housing makes up as much as 1/3 of the apartments, whereas it is between 5% and 6% in Bergen in total. Public housing only makes up 4% of the total Norwegian housing stock, and is today a housing possibility only for clients with least resources. In addition to the specific initiatives at Løvstakken, the allocation of public resources to this neighbourhood, per head of population, is much higher than in most other neighbourhoods; the area has even got the only neighbourhood police in the city.
In the Scandinavian welfare model, public resources are distributed according to needs so far as they can be measured, not by number of population. As parallel Wessel (1997 p. 87) points out that in Oslo the poorest town area is allocated 3 times more public money per inhabitant than the richest. There is dispute over the criteria for resource distribution, but not over the obliqueness as a principle. The aim of the Lovstakken case study was to examine the effects of the combined initiatives and investigate to what extent the type of local empowerment that followed the initiative is transferable. Germiso (2001) found that the area had greatly improved and that a more diversified social structure has developed during the last years. One reason for this is that the housing area is close to the town centre and the university. Students and other young people settle there in increasing numbers. There are, however, some negative aspects of this as students do not contribute much to the local activities. They tend to have their friends and social relations outside the housing area. So we see a combined effect of the daily time-space budgets and the neighbourhood initiatives. Both tend to modify considerably the effects of the ‘global city’ development.

In the 3rd Norwegian NEHOM case (Aarflot 2001b) the focus is on two different initiatives, both aimed at reducing the stigma that to some degree was attached to three small former council housing estates. The initiatives were based on the aim of social mix as well as somehow taking it for granted that co-op housing organisations are more able to run housing units than the public.

The first initiative, relating to two of the small estates (Rothaugen and Vaagedalen), was to sell the housing units to ‘mother’ co-operatives which transferred them to co-op renting. The public housing company retained, however, 30% of the apartments for social clients, but no families were evicted as a result of the sale. Thus, over time, it was believed that the housing estates would get a good mix of tenants and the stigma disappear. Connected to this property transfer were also some improvements in tenant empowerment. The case analyses to what extent the top-down initiative of social mixing has been combined with bottom-up empowerment. It was confirmed that the reputation of both areas had improved considerably.

The second initiative was taken for Adolph Bergsveg; 5 council housing blocks built in the 50s and formerly nicknamed ‘Chicago’. In the 1980s ca. half of all child-abuse cases in the city district of Landås were located to these 5 blocks. The initiative combined physical upgrading with cross-sector social initiatives to activate particularly the children and youngsters in positive local activities. The physical upgrading was combined with rebuilding two of the housing blocks as a nursing home, thus reducing the number of council apartments for social clients. This reduction was useful in making it possible to integrate the smaller number of social clients in the remaining blocks into the local social milieu. In the interviews with the inhabitants it was found that the social stigma had been reduced, but new conflicts had risen as the public housing company had allocated almost all the apartments in one of the blocks to immigrant families; the Norwegian clients in the two other blocks now nicknamed this ‘the ghetto block’. Officers at the public housing company admitted that it is not a wise policy to allocate asylum seekers and people with a different ethnicity in public housing...
estates with a high concentration of socially weak Norwegian families. Immigrants are generally better integrated in dispersed public housing in co-ops, using the 10 % rule.

Norwegian case studies exemplify the Norwegian belief in social mix and dispersal of public housing and social clients. But top-down spreading out of social clients or a policy of social mix is also very much dependent upon active, local third sector organisations and resource persons in the local housing estates establishing inclusive welfare activities. And not all social clients can be dispersed and included; some have to be taken special care of in wardened housing. In any case, welfare state policies like these counteract many of the negative effects of globalisation and the global city development. Norway has the resources to carry out such a policy, but what about less fortunate states in Europe? We need to have a look at the situation in Hungary and the results of the Hungarian case studies.

COMBATING EMERGING SOCIAL POLARISATION IN HUNGARY AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM.

“The rapid decline of housing estates into slums represents the ‘time bomb’ of urban development, a possible source of grave urban crisis in the future” (Enyedi 1998 p. 33).

In Eastern and Central Europe (Enyedi 1998), housing research in the last decade of the 20th century focused on the privatisation in the 1990s of almost the whole stock of the state owned housing estates and older tenement blocks. As maintained by Enyedi (1998), the huge, prefabricated and standardised housing units may rapidly decline into slums from their former position as highly subsidised and serviced modern housing for the working classes. The sale to sitting tenants at prices well below the market price reduced the publicly owned housing in Hungary from 22 % in 1990 to 5 % in 2000, the ratio of change being much larger in the capital, Budapest. In sub-standard estates (many poorly built by prefabricated elements in the 1970s) and old inner-city tenements in which renovation had been neglected in 40 years of public ownership, persons and families with an upward drive soon started to resell and moved to better housing environments. This created a quite new tendency of social polarisation in spatial terms, which may be seen as an adaptation to market economy and reflects tendencies as described in the dual-city model.

But, here we need to reflect a bit on the historical situation of the Hungarian society and the structure of housing laid down in Budapest from 1880s till 1990s. The pre- World War 2 society in Budapest was definitely class-based with stark income differences from the upper-class bourgeois down to the Roma (gypsy) population. And some parts of the city, mainly the Buda Hills, had upper class one-family housing. But the Central city had a housing structure that promoted a spatial social mix. In the dense and large housing development built in the urban growth period before 1914 the well off lived in large apartments facing the street, whereas low income groups lived in the same housing blocks in small apartments facing only the inner courtyards. These old tenement housing were nationalised after establishment of the
communist ‘People’s Republic’ in 1949, and housing allocation became strictly regulated. The upper ‘nomenclatura’ of course were given the best housing, but in general housing was regulated and distributed according to working class ideals. “Marxist-Leninist egalitarianism was fostered by the redistribution of the housing stock among the poor” (Kovacs et al 2002).

In Budapest the state became a dominant housing provider in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s due to large-scale housing programmes. Large state owned housing estates in the communist prefabricated style were built and the modern apartments allocated to privileged families. The rent was negligible and people that moved into the huge housing blocks could be seen as privileged. This meant that the social structure within both these estates and the pre- World War II inner city tenements was superficially fixed and mixed.

But the state housing provision was not sufficient to cater for all. Gradual liberalisation and private forms of housing were accepted from the 1960s on, it was “even supported by the regime, which was quite unique among the communist countries” (Kovacs et al 2002). And due to economic recession the state house building was gradually reduced during the 1980s.

The situation in 1990, after the fall of the communist regime, was a rather strange housing situation; the privileged were living in state owned housing with minimal rents, the less privileged had often to cope in small, often self-built private houses with poor public services.

The privatisation in the 1990s has turned this upside-down. Those staying on in the now privatised tenement blocks are less privileged than those living in the small private houses.

The fraction of the sitting tenants that were not able to buy their apartment became worst off; a large part of these belong to the Roma population. In the market economy segregation processes that had been suppressed under communism, gathered headway. Parts of the Buda Hills have become a sort of ‘Beverly Hills’, and the least attractive housing estates have lost a large portion of its resource persons. But, empty flats are not yet a common phenomena and most housing estates still have a considerable degree of social mix. A strange, in Western European comparison, situation is taking place in the former underprivileged areas of small private houses in Budapest. Socially up-moving families have started to buy cottages here, rebuild them, and introduce a new form of social mix that did not exist in these neighbourhoods before 1990. One can see large new houses with calling systems at the iron gates located next to cottages owned by rather poor families. Special kinds of social conflicts may result from these changes which might be interesting to study, but our NEHOM analyses have been confined to larger housing estates.

“After ten years of neglect and passivity the state (both local and central) gained more importance and played a more active role in the field of housing in the late 1990s. By 2000 the housing policy of Hungary has entered a new phase of its development where stronger co-operation and interaction between the public and private (both domestic and foreign) sectors became possible”. (Kovacs et al 2002).
A new social housing programme was launched by the government in summer 2000 by which the municipalities can get state funding for building new social renting flats, renovating old tenancies or buying flats for renting on the private market. After the first year of this programme it seems that there are huge demand for such renting possibilities, implying that the privatisation has gone too far and needs a social housing supplement. The fears voiced by Enyedi (1998) in the opening citation in this section has thus been taken account of; but also other factors, as pointed out above, seem to reduce the spatial polarisation of the dual-city model in Hungary.

The four Hungarian NEHOM case studies were carried out in four different administrative units, also governed by four different local administrations. They demonstrate four different, and generally positive, approaches to the housing problems at hand. The case studies of Middle-Ferencváros and Middle-Józsefváros exemplify successful inner-city urban initiatives in housing districts developed in the last quarter of the 19th Century as part of the mass-housing construction in the booming economy for both Vienna and Budapest in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Both neighbourhoods became rather dilapidated and marked by social deprivation by the end of communism. The situation in Józsefváros was worst, “regarded as the most problematic area in Budapest with the poorest segments of the society, many families being Roma” (Kovacs et al 2002 p. 3).

In Ferencváros (Holt-Jensen et al 2004, based on Szemző 2001) a rehabilitation programme was introduced in the late 1980s with the single aim to stop social and physical decay. The Ferencváros municipality decided on a rehabilitation programme that basically follows the French SEM model generating a radical shift from public to private ownership in the housing market and subsequently a profound gentrification process. In the part of the district studied this policy has been successful, extensive rebuilding and private investment projects have been carried out. But in spite of the intention to retain some part of the original population, most of the former tenants have moved to other, less high-cost parts of the district located further out from the city centre, or to other districts. Although a success in physical terms this renovation has led to more spatial segregation.

In Middle-Józsefváros, (Holt-Jensen et al 2004, based on Szekely 2001), due to its poor standards and bad reputation, private investors did not show too much interest, even though the area is located close to the city centre. The local municipal government, “together with Budapest City Government, set up an organisation, the RÉV8 Co. to cover all the activities connected with the rehabilitation” (Kovacs et al 2002 p. 3). This project had to be financed mainly by selling out building cites and dwellings in parts of the district. It has been an aim to preserve traditional architectonic values, local community values as well as the social structure and mix. Rehabilitation of some of the worst housing stock has been carried out without moving the inhabitants; in many cases the aim has not been to achieve a full modern standard, but a standard which the sitting tenants are able to live with in economic terms. In this way even the Roma population can be able to continue to live in the area, as well as, on the other hand, young families with more resources also starting to move in. The form of renovation may result in the same social structure as in Söder in Stockholm and Inner Oslo East as commented upon above. Being located close to the city centre with relatively cheap housing it will be attractive to young singles and professionals. It has also to be noted that
Hungarian traditions from way back support the notion of social mix in the same urban locations.

The NEHOM case studies of Újpest-Centre and Köbánya-Centre analyse working class housing estates in the outer districts built mainly through modern housing estates in the communist period. Both areas have a negative image among Budapest inhabitants, but new initiatives have been taken to build a new image.

The Köbánya-Centre case (Holt-Jensen et al 2004, built on Egedy 2001), analyses an urban rehabilitation programme initiated by the local district in 1998 for what in general coincides with the district centre. A forty million Euro programme is intended to be carried out over ten years. A shareholding company fully in the ownership of the district government is in charge of the programme. The objective has been to revitalise the quarter both physically “and socially through demolition of certain blocks and building up new ones but retaining the original layout and structure” (Kovacs et al 2002 p. 4). Included in this project has been the construction of new, high quality social renting dwellings, making the project a combination of urban rehabilitation and social housing reconstruction. This has guaranteed a mixed tenure in the area and given the local authority a degree of control over segregation processes. Once again an example of the potential in public policies to halt the spatial segregation processes.

The Újpest-Centre case, studied by Kovacs (2001) and summarized in Holt-Jensen et al (2004), is also an example of a special approach to urban regeneration initiated by the local district government. A genuine novelty here is “the gradual establishment of a link between urban regeneration programme and social housing policy, and the way how it was organised” (Kovacs et al 2002). An efficient co-operation was established between three actors; the local municipality (district), the central state and the private sector. At the edge of the neighbourhood, which was strongly affected by private sector regeneration, several smaller and less valuable vacant plots in municipal ownership were located. Money gained from the private developments nearby made it possible for the municipality, with national support, to build high quality social housing rental dwellings on some of these plots. The first dwellings of this kind were completed in December 2001, and families from run-down neighbouring buildings nearby were able to move in. The mixture obtained by private and public housing investments makes it possible to retain the degree of social mix.

Except for the Ferencváros case the local studies in Budapest exemplify efforts by the local governments to “maintain a fair balance between private and public ownership and a mixed tenure pattern that enables them to promote social cohesion” (Kovacs et al 2002 p.5). The political support for this policy can also be said to be rooted in Hungarian traditions, although large differences in private incomes now reappear after the Communist interregnum. People are accustomed to live in socially mixed neighbourhoods. Despite the conspicuous emergence of upper-class residential housing in the Buda Hills, most Hungarians of all social strata continue to live in neighbourhoods with more social mix than in most Western European cities, and definitely more mixed than neighbourhoods tend to be in the UK.
“The concepts of ‘social mix’ and ‘social balance’ are conceptually distinct, though often elided in policy debates. They both cover numerous overlapping characteristics of a population – age, tenure, class, income, ethnicity and so on. ‘Social mix’ suggests that the neighbourhood in question varies – on some or all of these factors. All neighbourhoods are, of course, ‘mixed’ to a degree – but some are more ‘mixed than others. ‘Balance’, on the other hand, connotes an external reference point with which comparisons can be made. --- But ‘balance’ has another meaning – that of ‘harmony’. A ‘balanced’ community, therefore, implicitly suggests a degree of positive social interaction and a degree of social cohesion. The ready but unexamined assumption in policy literature is that a more ‘mixed’ community lays the foundation for producing a more ‘balanced’ one in the second normative sense of the term – even though it could be equally plausible to argue that more mixed neighbourhoods will in fact engender more conflicts and tensions” (Cole and Goodchild 2000 p.351-352).

In the quotation above and in further argumentation Cole and Goodchild (2000) sum up the British discussion in a historical perspective on social mix within social housing policy. It is of no use here to comment upon the enormous amount of British academic literature on housing policies. Few countries have made larger investments within the field of social housing, but few other, at least European countries, have had more investment losses in this field than Britain. One small example may be the demolition in the 1980s of the New Gorbals in Glasgow built in the late 1960s. It must be puzzling for British housing politicians that many other European countries have less expensive failures in this field. Is there some structural features in the British society that is ripe for change? Are there traditions which are out of phase with the modern egalitarian society? We are not going into these questions here, but will only discuss two contrasting case studies carried out by foreign researchers in Glasgow; the success story of Reidvale Estate investigated by Romice (2001) and the Sighthill Estate problems as investigated by Aarflot (2001 a).

The Reidvale story is presented by Romice (2001) as a success, partly accounted for by the fact that social cohesion in this poor area was strong even before the renovation process started in the 1980s. And it has been strengthened. In 1998 the population of Reidvale was reduced to 2100 in around 1100 households. The building type is still 3/4 storey tenements, but the old buildings have been refurbished or demolished and substituted with high quality new apartments. A community centre, community kindergarten and an old people’s centre including sheltered houses were established. A neighbourhood perception study undertaken in1998 showed that 95 % of the inhabitants felt safe both at home and in the neighbourhood. Less than a quarter of the population regarded crime, vandalism, graffiti and drug culture as a neighbourhood problem. This is very different from many other Glasgow estates.

Some of the factors accounting for these positive results are:

- The renovation of the area was made step by step, so that people could move to a next door apartment while their house was renovated. A total renovation of the estate in one operation would have broken up the local community and probably only a fraction
would have moved back after renewal. This also restricted the intake of residents from
the Glasgow list of those in housing need and spread the intake of ‘outsiders’ over
many years, making it possible to integrate most of them into the existing community
and establishing a better age and social mix.

- Almost all flats are now in the ownership of the Community Based Housing
  Association (ca. 1000 on 1100), but still around 70 households which could have left
rented flats for owner occupation, continue to live in the area. This is contrary to
experiences of many other British Housing Association estates. The improved physical
quality of the environment may be a factor, but even more the gradual process of
empowerment and transfer of responsibility to the residents seem to be of importance.

- The stability of the social structure may in part be due to the fact that in the
  community Based Housing Association it has been possible to do some kind of
screening of social clients accepted and socialize those accepted into the local
community.

The chief executive of Reidvale Estate voiced the opinion that 10% social clients would be a
preferable upper limit in Reidvale. The percentage of ‘problem families’ acceptable in a
housing neighbourhood seems as well to be conditioned by the housing community as such,
its organisation and strength including availability of resource persons

Romice (2001) concludes that Reidvale has shown how achievements on the social / personal
level become effective and meaningful when linked to self-involvement. The empowerment
through the resident’s organisation has led to much more positive results on individual self-
esteeem and self-reliance

“if compared to two very rooted approaches which have characterised the British housing
panorama: the housing and state benefits at the core of British social housing provision and
welfare policies, and the Tatcherian ‘right to buy’; the first depriving people of incentives to
action, the second increasing stigmatisation of the poorest in society” (Romice 2001 p. 23)

Sighthill is an estate located just north of Glasgow City Centre, but separated from it and
other neighbourhoods by physical barriers (motorway, railway lines, a large cemetery) and
consequently is enclosed as a neighbourhood. The neighbourhood has a high density of
population concentrated in high-rise blocks and maisonettes, built in the 1960s, surrounded by
green space. The population is, according to local sources, around 6500 of which ethnic
minorities constitute 68 % (Aarflot 2001a). The area is divided in two by a road with
shopping facilities which separates Pinkston and Fountainwell, which from the time the
estates were built have been cradles for separate gangs of youth.

When built as a public housing estate Sighthill was definitely working-class but the housing
standard was much higher than in Reidvale in the 1970s. The social composition of the
residents has, however, changed over the years. One general factor is the rising
unemployment of blue-collar workers in the conurbation at large, a development hitting,
however, both Reidvale and Sighthill. But as Reidvale has ‘filtered up’ Sighthill has ‘filtered
down’. People with initiative and resources tend to move out as soon as there is an opportunity tipping the social balance in the wrong direction.

“A number of flats are owned by public offices, being used for instance to accommodate newly released prisoners. There is an assumption among the residents that their neighbourhood is being used as ‘dumping ground’, and this leads to suspicion of newcomers, regardless of their ethnic background” (Aarflot 2001a)

In 1999 200 Kosovo-refugees were temporarily accommodated in the area and were welcomed without any racial tension. But this has been followed by much larger allocation of asylum seekers in 2000-2001. Asylum seekers are now making up around 500 families in Sighthill, occupying 15% of the apartments, but between 20 and 25% of the population. In addition former immigrants of different ethnic origin make up a similar part of the population. Long interviews with representatives of the different population groups undertaken by Aarflot (2001a) in spring 2001, revealed increasing tensions in Sighthill. The local ‘old-timer’ British inhabitants do not understand why flats next door are being redecorated and fully furnished for the asylum-seekers and typically may express frustration in public meetings, although adding (as one woman did) that “it is not racism, it is resentment because they get all this for free”(Aarflot 2001a p.16).

Other ‘old-timer’ informants maintain, however, that the asylum seekers are not the problem, and maintain that the British should learn from the asylum seekers when it comes to taking good care of their children.

“You never see them commit any crime or bother our children. It is the alcoholics, drug addicted and the prostitutes that is the problem. And the problem only gets bigger and bigger, as these people are no good examples for the children growing up here. It is a recipe for disaster” (Informant 4 to Aarflot 2001 a p.16)

This informant, who is active in the local church and a key person in the community, may, however, leave Sighthill because his wife feels insecure as a result of what she sees as uncontrollable changes taking place in her neighbourhood. A lot of people are increasingly afraid to go out in the neighbourhood when it is getting dark and people are loosing faith in both authorities and police:

“The council just dump any kind of people in the area without taking responsibility. They think that us who live here is just a bunch of shit anyway, so that’s why they don’t care” (Informant 1a to Aarflot 2001 a p.17).
The asylum seekers on the one hand feel grateful for their accommodation, but are afraid of going out and feel trapped in the environment of the neighbourhood. Mostly they gather in the apartments with other refugees, and the youth only feel safe going out in groups.

One of the few places in which there is contact with the ‘old-timers’ is in the church and activities organised by the church community. Some of them do not understand why they are placed in the middle of a potential conflict zone.

“Walking from Sighthill to city centre is like walking from one country to another. In city centre you see different people from the ones you see here, they are smiling and look healthy” (Informant 7a to Aarflot 2001a p.19).

The parental care by the locals in the area comes as a huge culture shock to the asylum seekers; it is very hard for them to understand that the youths that commit violent attacks and vandalism is so lightly punished. Parents in immigrant families express worries for their own children, as they know they will have to be socialised with local kids through the school and with locals in the neighbourhood. They are thus reluctant to let their children play with the local children after school. On the other hand a

“group of young asylum seekers have started to arm themselves with knives and forming gangs. They have expressed to the police that if there is new attacks as bad as the one where two asylum seekers had to spend 5 days in hospital, they will not just watch anymore, but start fighting back” (Aarflot 2001 a p.19)

In spring 2001 a committee was being established to start building bridges between the two groups. Despite some positive achievements by the church organisations, it may, however, be too late to stop violence. A gang inspired murder took place in summer 2001. An even graver situation may develop when the second generation of asylum seekers grow up, trapped as they are between the cultures of their parents and that of the local street culture. Many local ‘old-timer’ resourceful persons are giving up:

“Sighthill didn’t use to be like this, it is the Housing Department that has ruined our neighbourhood by putting the wrong people in. Good neighbours do not have a chance” (Informant 1b to Aarflot 2001a p.23)

There might, however, be ways to stop the neighbourhood deteriorating; the most obvious being of course an immediate stop to the allocation of more apartments in Sighthill to the weakest social clients and new groups of asylum seekers. A policy as recommended by Morrison (2000) including market promotion, plans for physical regeneration and transformation of parts of the apartments to private or shared ownership, may be a solution. A main aim would be to create a much more socially mixed community. Aarflot (2001 a) suggests a process of improvement through gradually passing phases consisting of conscious
raising (learning about each other through media and all local meeting places), physical regeneration and sustainability (involving empowerment and transfer of responsibilities to the residents).

These two cases show two sides of the British housing dilemma. One is the oversupply of sub-standard housing in Northern England and Scotland, making it tempting for local authorities to allocate empty flats to new tenants as soon as possible without considering how the new tenants will fit in. They may argue that empty flats are often destructed by squatters and youth gangs making physical upkeep a problem. The other side of the dilemma is the tradition of spatial social segregation by class. It seems in Scandinavian, and possibly as well in Dutch and even Hungarian, eyes, that Myrdal's arguments (1945) in ‘American Dilemma’, that social segregation is very expensive for society is well understood.

Mainly the argument here rests on the possibilities for the next generation, that it there is definitely much to gain from giving all children equal education. This may be the most important argument for social mix, to guarantee that social deprivation is not inherited from one generation to the next. It seems to be of crucial importance that education is given in local schools of equal standard; the private schools increasingly popular also in Scandinavia being definitely a threat here. Bussing of school children as in the U.S., may be a form of solution when school districts do not have a reasonable social population mix, but it makes it of course more difficult for the children to attend after school activities together with their schoolmates.

CONCLUSION.

The globalisation processes leading to 'dual-city', social polarisation' and 'segregation' both in structural and spatial form is to a large extent modified by space-time budgets and private choices as well as by welfare state modifications. From NEHOM project analyses (Holt-Jensen et al 2004) we see it as necessary to combat spatial segregation leading on to spatial deprivation. This can be done through:

- compensation, in economic terms as relatively larger transfers per inhabitant to services for the population in deprived areas; through stronger investments in rehabilitation and physical upkeep; and through surveillance by neighbourhood wardens (an initiative studied in an English NEHOM case study).
- social mix, directly top-down through dispersal of social clients and possibly new immigrants, through urban renewal attracting new better off inhabitants to the area and through an urban development planning mixing different house and tenant types in the same area thus attractive a mixture of income types.
- creation of meeting places as community house, youth centre, local kindergartens and centres for elderly (church, cafe etc.)
• empowerment of the locals which may be achieved through housing associations or co-operatives and which may be strengthened through communal work. Hidden resources that exist in unemployed and deprived people may be released by this and lead to great gains both socially and in money terms. In one of the German NEHOM cases garden plots on green areas between the blocks of a social estate function as such a simple and positive initiative. In the Løvstakken case (Germiso 2001) the locally elected Youth Council, run by teenagers, is another example.

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