

ENABLING PROJECT TEAM CULTURE

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
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Abstract

This paper examines the cultural context in which projects are realised; how the organisational culture of projects may be influenced and, in turn, what effects organisational culture has on performance. National cultures constitute primary contexts which are mediated through the organisations, and their representative individuals, comprising the participants in project temporary multi organisations. The values of participants underpin the brief for the project which expresses performance goals and targets and so, is fundamental in determining commitment to the project and the motivations of participants, hence, values are examined within the context of business operational requirements. Recognition of interdependence of participants in the fluid, power-based, business coalition through which projects are realised promotes the perspective of projects as joint ventures to encourage teamwork. Thus, the ideal of team formation and teamwork is discussed against the construct of temporary multi organisations and their inherent, well-known issues. Drawing on a breadth of culture-related research, including business alliancing, the paper concludes with a summary of how attention to cultural issues may foster teamwork and, hence, synergetic performance benefits with the increased wealth generated by the output equitably distributed amongst participants.

2.1. Introduction – Identification of issues

The rhetoric of teams and teamwork on construction projects has been commonplace for many years and has acted to perpetuate the perspective that teams arise naturally in project execution. Unfortunately, the reality is significantly different such that teams are a rarity, rather than a norm, leading to exacerbation of the widely-recognised problems for project management performance which tend to be grounded in lack of cooperation and integration.

A particular issue relating to construction, indeed to any project-based industry, is that projects are realised (designed and constructed) through temporary multi organisations (TMOs) which extends the issues of debate within transaction cost economics concerning firms, markets, and hierarchies – in particular, where the boundaries of firms lie. Thus, Macmillan and Farmer (1979) note that “...Cyert and March...suggested that for a managerially complex organization to be viable, there must be some kind of ‘organisational coalition’ across different sub-functions”. Further, Jarillo (1988) notes that “firms act in a complex environment, where no firm can really be understood without reference to its relationship with many others” and so, suggests that networks provide an appropriate perspective in which to examine the supply side. Eccles (1981) uses the concept of a quasi-firm in respect of construction TMOs, “...an organizational form with characteristics of both markets and hierarchies”.

Thus, the notion of teams and teamwork should be applied at the inter- as well as the intra-organisational (firm) level. At the intra-organisational level, team building may occur relating to individuals, divisions, etc.; a particular concern for M-form structured organisations. Inter-organisational team building is regarded as significant in Western (individualistic) societies in which the organisations (post-holders) are the foci of relationships (unlike Eastern societies in which the individual person occasions the relationship, independent of the organisation). Such issues reflect the (Western-dominated) management literature in which debate concerns whether organisations can behave – and so, have relationships – beyond the individuals representing/constituting them; the current consensus indicates that organisational identity and behaviour can be independent of the organisation’s members, which also raises issues of trust and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Those two concepts are of increasing importance and merit serious attention because construction is a people-business. It is quite difficult to address trust and CSR if organizations do not have appropriate procedures. Vos, et al., (2002) produced such findings from governance investigations of a recent case of fraud in the Dutch infrastructure-industry.

The concept of ‘enabling’, especially in respect of human relationships and the consequences of them, should not be assumed to indicate a ‘toolkit for implementation and control’ but rather to foster understanding of the human conditions and processes which impact on relationships and consequent behaviour. The OED provides various definitions of ‘enable’, including “to authorize, sanction, empower; to give legal power or license to; to make possible or easy; also to give effectiveness to (an action).” Thus, here, we are concerned with examination of ways in which a ‘team approach’ amongst project participants may be brought about; naturally, a motivational assumption is that both project and project management performance will be enhanced by a ‘team approach’.

The next vital aspect concerns the concept of a team. Restricting the context to the human domain, a team must comprise at least two persons and, although the maximum number of members is unlimited in theory, pragmatic concerns have prompted considerable research to determine optimal and maximum sizes of teams (see, e.g., Belbin, 1981). The essential constituent for a team to be possible is a common goal – goal congruence – amongst the participants, in respect of which any and all other, perhaps individual, goals are subjugated to become insignificant in influencing behaviour. Erez and Zidon (1984) found that goals should be challenging but not enormously so such that performance improved as goals became reasonably challenging

and commitment to them increased; however, further increases in goal difficulty resulted in declining commitment and performance. Usually, team members are significantly different from each other in physical, mental, and behavioural attributes; indeed, the presence of sufficient attributes and their distribution amongst team members is commonly held to be of major importance in determining (relative) performance of teams (Belbin, 1981). Differences, in such contexts, imply specialisations and, hence, diversity but, for teams, that must not result in independence and, thereby, destroy the collective – so, integration is vital but, often, the most difficult aspect to achieve (see, e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).

In addition to the well-known issues of leadership and followership in team development and operation, aspects of trust as well as power sources and structuring between participants must be addressed along with the vital component of commitment. Those considerations must be viewed interactively in endeavouring to foster performance in achieving the project (product) and project management (process – realisation) goals. The goals may include the way of collaborating between the parties. When parties work together, there is often still a need for balancing between trust and control, as in practices regarding procurement-procedures Tjihuis (2004).

The third aspect is culture, for which Hofstede's (1994a) definition is employed widely – 'the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes one category of people from another' and, commonly, is applied at two levels – national and organisational. Projects present particular concerns for examination of culture in that they operate as TMOs (Cherns and Bryant, 1984) and so, present mixes of cultures of constituent organisations and, increasingly, nations as well. That yields complexities of combinations of underpinning values, manifestations of behaviour, language etc. and practices. Thus, culture provides both contexts in which projects are realised and used (as products) together with shaping the (organisations and) processes employed.

So, what do we mean by a 'project team culture'? If, for a moment, we can regard culture as 'how we do things around here' (Schneider, 2000), then, that organisational perspective prompts the notion of integration of participants on a project through invoking goal congruence (regarding the task/project), common practices, and coordinated, collaborative processes and procedures. Unfortunately, that still begs the question of establishment of the goal(s), despite recognising the imperatives of communication and acceptance of that goal(s). A common expression of the overriding goal of project participants is to 'satisfy the client' but that still raises two difficult questions:

who is the client? and,
what is needed to satisfy the client?

On today's, especially major, international, projects, both questions are mammoth.

To focus on satisfying only one project participant (or group of participants) is dangerously myopic. For a project to enjoy a true team culture, the 'technical' and business performance requirements of all participants must be accommodated and accepted. Hence, the team concept must include not only the members of the participants (organisations) constituting the project TMO but the total array of stakeholders – including future owners, users, and others affected by the realisation and

presence of the project (e.g. the general populace – due to impacts of the project on the environment (see, for example, Fellows, 2006). That is epitomised in the development of a ‘shared project brief’ – a primary input to enable a real project team to be assembled.

Usually, the value (worth) of a product or process is judged by measuring performance and comparing such measurement(s) with criteria (variables) and/or targets (forecasts of desired – hopefully, feasible – performance). Although, in construction and other project-based industries, product and process performances are interdependent, the focus tends to be on the process of project realisation irrespective that the product is commonly in use for a long period; the rationale for the process focus in this context is that construction is a major component of project realisation. Thus, the outputs from project teams/TMOs are both the process value chain for project realisation and the user-wealth embodied in the project as product-in-use.

2.2. Culture

National

Usually, national cultures are regarded as the most generic level for examination – which, most often, employ the four dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980), subsequently extended to five (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1994b):

Power Distance – *“the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally”* (Hofstede, 1994b: 28)

Individualism/Collectivism – *“Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.”* (ibid: 51)

Masculinity/Femininity – *“masculinity pertains to societies in which gender roles are clearly distinct (i.e., men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focussed on material success whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life); femininity pertains to those societies in which social gender roles overlap (i.e., both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life).”* (ibid: 82-83)

Uncertainty Avoidance – *“the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.”* (ibid: 113)

Long-Termism – *“the fostering of virtues orientated towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift.”* (ibid: 261) / Short-Termism – *“the fostering of virtues related to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’, and fulfilling social obligations.”* (ibid: 262-263).

Chen, Meindl and Hunt (1997) discuss the division of the cultural construct of

collectivism into vertical and horizontal components. They juxtapose those components to Hofstede's (1980) dimension of individualism, as, "...individualism (low concern for collectivity and low concern for in-group others) at one end of the spectrum with vertical collectivism (high concern for the collectivity) and horizontal collectivity (high concern for in-group others) at the other end". They find that, "because the vertical scale items refer to work situations and the horizontal scale items primarily refer to non-work situations, one may speculate that the Chinese are becoming 'organizational individualists' even though they are still cultural collectivists in other domains...". Hofstede (1983) notes the correlation between wealth and individualism in various countries and continues that "...collectivist countries always show large Power Distances but Individualist countries do not always show small Power Distance". Gomez, et al., (2000) explain that people in collectivist cultures favour in-group members but discriminate against out-group members.

Organisational

The combination of cultural manifestations, especially language and behaviour, have a major impact on whether a deal is struck, with whom, within what formal and informal frameworks, how it is executed and with what consequences (see, e.g., Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997). Thus, to carry out business successfully, particularly international business, it is important to be appreciative of and sensitive to differences between participants and their reasons and consequences. Many of the difficulties which are common in construction projects seem attributable to two primary causes – conflicts of business objectives (manifestations of values of the participants), and lack of sensitivity and accommodation of differences between participants – hence, the need for awareness of organisational cultures.

Hofstede (1994b) proposes six dimensions for analysis of organisational cultures:

- Process – Results Orientation (technical and bureaucratic routines {can be diverse} – outcomes {tend to be homogeneous})
- Job – Employee Orientation (derives from societal culture as well as influences of founders, managers)
- Professional – Parochial (educated personnel identify with profession(s) – people identify with employing organisation)
- Open – Closed System (ease of admitting new people, styles of internal and external communications)
- Tight – Loose Control (degrees of formality, punctuality etc., may depend on technology and rate of change)
- Pragmatic – Normative (how to relate to the environment, n. b. customers; pragmatism encourages flexibility).

Usually, organisational cultures derive from the founders of the organisation and others who have had major impact on the organisation's development (e.g. Henry Ford, John Harvey-Jones). Such people, through influence over employment of staff, shape the values and behaviour of members of the organisation to develop the organisation's identity – both internally and externally. Thus, organisational cultures (and climates) are self-perpetuating – persons who 'fit' are hired and they 'fit' because they are hired; errors of 'fit' are subject to resignation or dismissal. Further, organisational cultures develop through the necessity of maintaining effective and efficient working relationships amongst stakeholders (both permanent and temporary) and so, do evolve

in response to internal and external dynamics. Pressure for cultural change commonly arises from external parties, particularly in situations of environmental turbulence and attempts to enter new markets.

Cameron and Quinn (1999) employ a 'competing values' model in which 'flexibility and discretion' is juxtaposed to 'stability and control' on one dimension; the other dimension juxtaposes 'internal focus and integration' and 'external focus and differentiation'. The resultant model yields four quadrants, each denoting a type of organisational culture – Clan, Adhocracy, Market, Hierarchy:

Clan – *“Some basic assumptions in a clan culture are that the environment can be best managed through teamwork and employee development, customers are best thought of as partners, the organization is in the business of developing a humane work environment, and the major task of management is to empower employees and facilitate their participation, commitment, and loyalty”* (ibid: 37)

Adhocracy – *“A major goal of an adhocracy is to foster adaptability, flexibility, and creativity where uncertainty, ambiguity and/or information-overload are typical. Effective leadership is visionary, innovative and risk-orientated. The emphasis is on being at the leading edge of new knowledge, products, and/or services. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important”* (ibid: 38-9)

Market – *“The major focus of markets is to conduct transactions with other constituencies to create competitive advantage. Profitability, bottom line results, strength in market niches, stretch targets, and secure customer bases are primary objectives for the organization. Not surprisingly, the core values that dominate market type organizations are competitiveness and productivity”* (ibid: 35)

Hierarchy – *“The organizational culture compatible with this form is characterised by a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people do. Effective leaders are good coordinators and organizers. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important. The long-term concerns of the organization are stability, predictability, and efficiency. Formal rules and policy hold the organization together”* (ibid: 34).

Schein (1984) suggests two primary types of organisational culture: 'free flowing' – an unbounded, egalitarian organisation without (much) formal structure, thereby encouraging debate and (some) internal competition; and 'structured' – a bounded, rigid organisation with clear rules and requirements. (Such categorisation is analogous to the organic-mechanistic analysis of Burns and Stalker (1961).) That perspective is strong in the discussion of the operation of construction projects – formal systems are in place (organisation charts, contractual procedures, etc.) but those systems are used 'only in the last resort' – when things go wrong. Projects operate through networks of informal relationships which emphasise 'doing the pragmatic' to achieve progress. The belief is that through strict adherence to the formal system, the project would quickly 'grind to a halt' due to many bottlenecks (as in the contract procedures regarding oral variations). However, the risks involved must be understood (which suggests that a low level of risk aversion / uncertainty avoidance is common).

Handy (1985) identifies four primary forms of organisational culture. Power, is configured as a web with the primary power at the centre; emphasis is on control over

both subordinates and external factors (suppliers etc. and nature). Role, involves functions/professions which provide support of the over-arching top management; emphasis is on rules, hierarchy and status through legality, legitimacy and responsibility (as in contractual rights, duties and recourse). Task, in which jobs or projects are a primary focus, yields an organisational net (as in a matrix organisation); structures, functions, and activities are evaluated in terms of contribution to the organisation's objectives. Person, in which people interact and cluster relatively freely; emphasis is on serving the needs of members of the organisation through consensus. Handy suggests that the main factors which influence organisational culture are: history and ownership, size, technology, goals and objectives, environment and people.

Examination of the various, alternative sets of dimensions used to analyse national cultures and organisational cultures indicates considerable conceptual commonality. Further, dimensions of organisational culture generally align with the human relations – task schools of management thought (see, for example, Herzberg, et al., 1967 – theory X and theory Y).

2.3. Values and business

Values and beliefs lie at the heart of culture. Rokeach (1972) regards values as signifying enduring beliefs in particular ways of behaving or preferences for states in the future. An important part of a belief system is the morals component which leads to the notion of ethics. Morals concern judgements of what is right and what is wrong, what behaviour is good and what is bad, and so on. Hinman (1997) distinguishes morals and ethics by regarding morals as first order beliefs, and practices about what is good and what is bad which guide behaviour and ethics as second order, reflective consideration of moral beliefs and practices. Not only should ethics refer to values but, in order to secure operation, reference must be made to principles and standards regarding behaviour. That necessity immediately raises questions of whose values are to be employed in determining the standards and related issues requiring people to exercise judgement. In developing project briefs, it is important to determine whose values are used as they not only shape the content of the brief and, thus, the performance required but also impact on the acceptability of the brief to other project participants.

The essence of modern, capitalist market-based business transactions is summarised by Cox (1999), who asserts that, “essentially, business is about appropriating value for oneself...only by having the ability to appropriate value from relationships with others...can business be sustained....must...be conflicts of interest between vertical participants in supply chains, just as there are between those competing horizontally...In Western (as opposed to Japanese) culture most suppliers are basically opportunistic rather than deferential”. Most clients¹, consultants, and constructors are businesses and so, must operate subject to business performance requirements whilst, at the same time, subject to regulatory necessities and, often, the need to behave professionally – which means on a moral/ethical basis and with regard to perceived social good, not just in accordance with the requirements of the ‘paymaster’.

The value which businesses endeavour to appropriate is financial and is manifested in turnover and profit. Baumol (1959) concludes that the objective of any business is to

¹ The behaviour applies increasingly to client organizations in the public sector which are being required to operate as ‘quasi-businesses’.

maximise turnover subject to a minimum profit constraint – because business is operated by managers (who seek turnover maximisation) but with its financial performance scrutinised by owners (who seek profitability as return on investment). Further, Hutton (2002) notes the importance of the active investors – fund managers of banks, insurance companies etc. who operate in the global financial markets – who require businesses to provide non-decreasing dividends.

Such business-derived pressures on participants encourage self-interest orientations over joint perspective in both developing project briefs and realisation processes. As collaboration is usually employed to achieve good solutions to technical problems, so collaboration over business aspects, notably regarding distributions of (financial) benefits from the outcomes, is a desirable input to secure harmonious team working and synergetic outputs.

The moral and ethical practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) give rise to further aspects of value which are entering the frame of business performance assessment – including environmental protection, support of education and training, and community assistance programmes. Internally, Organisational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB) relates to the ethics of the way employees treat the business, rather as moral-based motivation to perform beyond the requirements of the contract of employment (and general norms) (see, e.g., Organ, 1988). Clearly, CSR may yield financial benefits through building a favourable reputation without advertising whilst apparent OCB may be brought about by threats to the workforce; thus, some scepticism regarding business motives and practices is justified, especially when the force and extent of opportunism (Williamson, 1975) is acknowledged (such as in construction work allocation practices and claims etc.).

2.4. Teams and team culture

Given that a team must comprise two or more persons who are endeavouring to achieve a common goal, team culture constitutes the variables / constructs (dimensions) which are important for team formation, operation and continuance. Several authors have addressed team formation and performance (e.g., Belbin, 1981; Tuckman and Jensen, 1977). Thamain (2004) found a hierarchy of drivers for team performance:

- effective communications;
- trust, respect, and credibility;
- overall team performance; and,
- interesting, stimulating work.

Westby and Ford (1993) propose four functions of team culture:

- sharing patterns of interpretation and perception;
- sharing patterns of feelings and values;
- defining who is a member; and,
- prescribing behaviour.

Thus, teams, in common with other culture-groupings, create their own language, jargon, and stories which are used to describe and demonstrate the values, beliefs, and perspective of the team.

Thus, a team culture may be identified through the dimensions of a team – goal congruence, leadership and followership, commitment, motivation, trust, and power – all operating within the ‘technical’ context of goal realisation. In the context of construction, ideally, the members of the team are all the participants on a project – in practice, they are the representatives of the major participants once determined, hence the fluid and evolving membership of a project TMO. However, for many projects, some participants may be unknown (although their likely nature may be identified – such as tenants of shops in a major development, or occupiers of housing) requiring the interests of such participants to be safeguarded through trust and ‘professionalism’ (and their ethical/moral underpinnings).

Grisham (2006) determined that there are characteristics of leadership which are effective, irrespective of the cultures of project participants – including the ability to inspire followers who, then, pursue the values espoused by the leader (as in charismatic leadership). That requires the leader to demonstrate cross-cultural leadership intelligence (sensitivity and accommodation of cultural differences etc.) and, then, nurtures the growth of a team culture using clear, open, and responsive communication, including articulation of the goals and ‘storytelling’ to foster team development. Storytelling may operate not only to articulate the team culture as developed but also to encourage further development of the culture as desired (by the leader).

Commitment is an affect – a psychological, positive feeling of association with and desire to achieve/enhance some future state (performance of a project realisation; well-being of a person). “Commitment ...refers to one’s attachment to or determination to reach a goal, regardless of the goal’s origin....acceptance...refers...to commitment to a goal which is assigned” (Locke, et al., 1988). Thus, commitment acts as an internal motivator under the influence of which the person strives for enhanced performance in respect of the subject of the commitment; non-commitment to organisational goals can lead to ‘soldiering’ or restriction of effort and output. The reward may be only intrinsic – the individual’s satisfaction felt with the performance achieved (and subject to valence, as in Vroom’s (1964) theory of motivation). Dainty, et al., (2005) assert that project affinity, emotional attachments to the project (objectives/purpose) outcome, enhances how people work, especially their organisational citizenship behaviour, thereby fostering performance.

Rothschild (1993) categorises strategic leadership as a set of four ‘faces’, which he profiles as ‘risktaker’, ‘caretaker’, ‘surgeon’ and ‘undertaker’. This indicates that, although strategic leadership should help organizations to survive in the long run, it does not mean that decisions will not have negative consequences on (some part(s) of) an organisation in the short – medium term. Decisions must address the (perceived) reality, focussing on clear goals and within a (motivated) strategy.

Motivation, more generally, under most of the theoretical perspectives, operates on the basis of anticipation of extrinsic and/or intrinsic rewards to performance (usually in excess of some pre-determined, target level) occasioned through greater effort on the part of the motivated person – such as the productivity bonus schemes so common in construction. Indeed, in construction, there has been widespread use of money (extrinsic reward) as a motivator for both operative and managerial employees – following the generic concept of economic rationality which operates for investors through return on investment (non-decreasing stream of dividends and capital growth; Hutton, 1996). It

does appear that many motivators (performance incentives originating outside the subject person) have only a temporary effort – performance enhancing effect as they can become a generally-accepted component of the ‘basic’ employment conditions. Thus, it seems that the intrinsic motivators may be more effective and enduring.

Trust is a fundamental in teams. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) assert that true trust occurs when the ‘trustor’ believes that the ‘trustee’ has an incentive to cheat but refrains from doing so. The (perceived) reasons for the trustee’s restraint give rise to several categories of trust, of varying strengths. Bachmann (2001) employs categories of system, personal, and institutional as the bases of trust; whilst an alternative categorisation is dispositional or deterrent-based trust. Zucker (1986) proposes three modes of trust production – characteristic (relating to dispositional trust), process (based on experiences of the trustee’s having met expectations), and institutional (relating to established guidelines of behaviour and sanctions for transgressors who are discovered). Clearly, in instances of no previous relationships, dispositional trust governs the initiation of the relationship but within the institutional (deterrent-related) social and business context; thereafter, experience of actions and responses can supplement the basis of relational behaviour (see, e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1995). An important aspect of trust as a promoter of teamwork is its role in fostering the sharing of knowledge as an aid to performance, especially regarding tacit knowledge (see, e.g., Polanyi, 1958).

Power is the ability to influence or control the behaviour of other(s) whether through own behaviour (active power) or perceptions by the other(s) (potential power, as activated by the subject(s)). Power may be regarded as control over resources (physical, intellectual, emotional) (Scott, 1992). French and Raven (1959) identify five main sources of a leader’s power: legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, expert power, and referent power. The first two sources concern the leader’s position within the organisation’s formal structure; coercive power follows closely but is modified by the personalities of the leader and the followers; expert power relates to differential knowledge (expertise and experience) of the leader relative to the followers; referent power is, largely, socially determined from differences between the leader and followers and how the followers access the leader’s superior, differential attributes to assist them in their own activities (via expectancy, valence and instrumentality – Vroom, 1964). Further sources of power have been identified as personal power (support and trust by followers), and connection power (access to persons and information; alternatively, ‘political power’) (Finlay, 2000).

Perhaps a further facet for teams and teamwork is empowerment – the delegation of authority, and appropriate responsibility, for making and implementing decisions. Possible and suitable empowerment depends on the culture and organisational climate, the personalities and abilities of the people involved, trust, and regulations. Commonly, empowerment is regarded as positive, and a performance motivator, but that may not apply in all cultures (notably, those with large power distances and high uncertainty avoidance). However, empowerment does seem necessary for members of teams to maximise their contributions, if only through removing fears. It may well be that significant empowerment necessitates decision making by consensus.

Teams may operate best through command and control in contexts/situations (such as emergencies) in which chains of command and immediate compliance are most

effective. Elsewhere, a leader's exercising an 'outside view', based on which instructions are issued (such as the coach/manager of a sports team) can be effective. However, in the vast majority of situations, control is, largely, illusory – persons have much less control/influence over future events than they believe.

2.5. Discussion: Project TMOs and teams

If we consider organisational development as a logical progression, the generic sequence involves goals (aims and objectives; vision and mission), strategy (targets and means for achievement), structure, resourcing, and performance. Apart from such horizontal analysis, a vertical layering of tactics and operations is involved for organisational functioning. As, by definition, an organisation must involve a minimum of two persons, the importance of relationships in organisational development and success is obvious.

The structuring of an organisation may be viewed as an enabling decision, given the perspectives that 'structure follows strategy' (Chandler, 1962) and that structure impacts performance – the underpinning premises of much research in construction procurement. Naturally, as organisations continue, the interaction between strategy and structure forms an iterative, interactive cycle (commonly as a 'rolling programme'); as applies to all the components of the generic sequence of organisational development, above. Thus, if the project goals are determined collaboratively and take account of the interests of all the participants, then the ensuing strategy and structuring of the TMO and realisation procedures will tend to be conducive to greater collaboration.

A 'forty hour workshop' with only representatives of the most powerful participants, is virtually certain to be ineffective in changing the (traditional) fragmented and self-interested opportunistic project climate to one of integrated cooperation.

Irrespective of the procurement arrangements (fragmented/integrated; 'traditional' design-tender-build, management oriented, design and construct, concession arrangements) all but the smallest of projects are realised through a TMO. The wider the boundaries of the TMO are considered to be (i.e., the greater the inclusion of participants in the TMO), the more numerous and diverse are the organisations and so, the complexity seems to increase geometrically. That situation is enhanced by the transience of membership for many participants (e.g. specialist subcontractors) and that the identity of many is unlikely to be known significantly before the times when their inputs are required.

Popular rhetoric discusses 'project teams' whether considering the TMO or a grouping within an individual firm. Literature tends to separate such considerations into issues of teams and teambuilding (for performance enhancement) within an organisation, including TMOs, and alliancing between organisations (such as formal joint ventures). Partnering workshops, for instance, constitute a blending of the two levels in that the alliance relationships between the participating firms are developed and enhanced through their representatives at the workshop and on the project. Given that organisational representation is involved, good communications are vital which, given the history of the construction industry, is likely to be a problem (see, e.g., Higgin and Jessop, 1963; Latham, 1994; Construction Industry Review Committee, 2001).

Thus, particularly in the context of project TMOs, team formation, continuation and

extension requires flexibility throughout the realisation phases and, because relationships between both individuals and organisations are involved, the concepts of bridging and bonding, as major elements of social capital are germane. Edelman, et al., (2004) note that “bridging social capital examines the external linkages of individuals and groups that help to define their relationships...bonding social capital focuses on the internal relationships of a focal actor and specifically examines the linkages and corresponding relationships among individuals and groups within a focal group or organization”.

The notions of bridging and bonding may be examined in relation to the cultural dimension of individualism – collectivism. Collectivists tend to construct less permeable boundaries around the in-group and act with greater tolerance and favour towards in-group members. Individualists tend to have looser ties and have a wider network of social contacts. Thus, for collectivists, bonding is strong but bridging is more difficult, and *vice-versa* for individualists. An additional facet is that relationships in collectivist societies are between persons primarily (organisations, which persons represent are, very much, a secondary consideration), whilst in individualists societies, business relationships tend to focus on the organisations (which the persons involved represent, potentially only temporarily).

Understanding and appreciation of underlying cultures, as manifested in preferred/normal behaviour, is essential for team development and performance as there is a very strong tendency for people to preserve and return to the *status quo* in response to (attempted) imposed change. Whilst culture and its manifestations are dynamic and constantly evolving, change initiatives, which seek to hasten or alter the change vector are likely to have significant, unpredictable consequences (see, e.g., Harris and Ogbonna, 2002) and be transient in effects; it is only if the changes are imposed for considerable time and (become) accepted by the subjects that they can endure ‘naturally’. Thus, the perspective of (organisational) culture as a ‘tool’ which managers can employ to effect change to enhance performance is, at best, fraught with problems!

Nicolini (2002), following an extensive analysis of the literature on organisational climate, notes that “...in order for teams to obtain an high level of trust and cohesiveness appropriate action needs to be taken so that the design, group selection and formation processes, management style and practices, reward and recognition principles, communication mechanisms and systems are all aligned”. That calls for extensive awareness and great sensitivity in organisational design of the TMO which, must fall to the ‘project champion’ – the overall project manager (and leader). Thus, the appointment of the appropriate person is critical; but who appoints and on what basis and using whose criteria? The obvious answer is the ‘commissioning client’ – which then raises difficulties of that client’s expertise regarding construction projects, awareness of performance criteria, and dominance of those criteria for all other participants – for project management and for the project, all within the context of project realisation processes.

Given that construction projects are realised through TMOs, that TMOs have short life-spans, and that their membership is transient and highly variable between projects, a combination of dispositional trust and experiential trust applies initially. A significant problem is the lack of time and contact for (further) trust to be established. Thus,

Myerson, et al., (1996) have developed the concept of 'swift trust'. That is of particular importance because early decisions have the most far-reaching consequences; contextually, the application is most germane for international projects and those using 'virtual' methods.

Erez (1997) suggests a model of work behaviour which is grounded in culture and motivation. The Cultural Values interact with Motivational approaches to determine the effectiveness of the Self Derived Motives to yield Work Behaviour (which leads to performance). Thus, for example, individualist cultures favour equity rewards, collectivist cultures favour equality rewards, but people in 'developing countries' tend to favour needs-based rewards. The matching of motivational approaches to cultural values is critical to achieving good performance.

Given that projects are executed by TMOs comprising disparate organisations (fragmented) and that adequate coordination and cooperation is essential for 'success', it seems that the dividing pressures (specialisation etc.) operate as natural forces of economics and organisation such that it indicates that the integrational requirements should be the focus of attention. Thus, it is appropriate to investigate the TMOs as joint ventures/business alliances, albeit that most are informal JVs.

The literature on joint ventures and strategic alliances is replete with studies noting the extent and reasons for failure – about 60% fail (Anderson Consulting, 1999), half due to poor management and half due to poor strategy (Alliance Management International Ltd., 1999). Further, Das and Teng (1999) note that "because of incompatible organizational routines and cultures, partner firms often do not work together efficiently". Clearly, transformation is necessary if the project participants (members of the TMO) are to feel comfortable with adapting their own, existing procedures to blend with those of the other participants; much 'give and take' is likely to be required so that the most suitable procedures for the project are adopted. That perspective is in notable contrast to the usual result of organisational mergers which, relatively rapidly, emerge as a take over by the (economically/financially) most powerful (Furnham, 1997).

Sheth and Parvatiyar (1992) employ a two dimensional analysis – purpose (strategic / operational) and parties (competitors / non-competitors) – to examine forms, properties and characteristics of business alliances, as shown in figure 2.1. They determine that uncertainty and trust are the two primary (independent) constructs which affect (formal) alliance relationships and their institutional arrangements. Bachmann (2001) views trust and power as means for social control within business relationships. Those concerns are commonly manifested in the criteria for selection of partners and the establishment of safeguards against opportunistic behaviour by (other) alliance members; thereby increasing *ex ante* costs in the business (relationship) venture (Williamson, 1985).

Given the importance of relationships and behaviour to the operation and (success) performance of joint ventures, together with their objectives, it seems clear that culture is of fundamental impact, especially when considering compatibilities amongst participants to convert a TMO into a (high-performing) team.




Figure 2.1. - Properties of Alliances (Source: Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1992)

2.6. Future research agenda

Culture is an all-pervading human phenomenon and, analogous to the structuration of social institutions, is dynamic. Thus, it seems helpful for studies to address cultururation as a dynamic construct in which trends, perturbations and their causes are examined. In tandem with such research, further studies could develop means of identifying and addressing ‘cultural distance’ beyond the index-oriented approach which is popular currently. Those studies would inform more detailed, project-based research into selection of participants (organisational and individual) for compatibility in the business context of project realisation to augment the traditional technical foci (extending the research of Baiden, et al., 2006).

Further research into participants’ hierarchies of values would be useful to inform how incompatibilities and business objective generated conflicts may be reconciled to yield project briefs containing more complete statements of realisable and accepted performance targets. Such goal congruence should serve to motivate performance improvement and help avoid dissonance regarding the performance achieved.

Further studies concerning organisational citizenship in respect of both organisational citizenship behaviour by employees and fulfilment of corporate social responsibilities, both inwards and outwards, by organisations should lead to greater ethical behaviour and so enhance trust. A transaction cost approach could be adopted to assist in measuring consequences from a business performance, as well as a social perspective.

2.7. Conclusion

It is not possible to create a team culture by fiat (it seems more likely that a Lexus, if not a Mercedes or Rolls Royce, is required). Unless a team culture is generated, and generated at the conception/inception, and sustained thereafter, performance is likely to fall short of its potential.

A particular fundamental is to determine what performance is required and is appropriate – the criteria, levels, and to ensure that all participants both are aware of the requirements and accept them, preferably commit to them, and so, are motivated to their achievement. That necessitates good communication, sensitivity to and coordination of the participants, and leadership. Trust plays a fundamental role here.

The interaction between goal determination, selection of participants, TMO structure, and TMO procedures are fundamentally important for achieving good project management performance and project performance. Goal congruence (setting, communication and acceptance) underpins teamwork.

Selection of appropriate participants, to secure the requisite combination of ‘technical’ expertise and teamworking contributions must occur with due regard to the personalities and cultural manifestations of the array of possible participants to ensure compatibility and complementarity. Those aspects must be examined in the context of the broader culture and the institutional environment for trust and cooperative working to be fostered.

The structure of the TMO provides the (formal) framework for the project realisation processes and, although likely to be amended to actually operate through an evolving informal structure, is a strong indicator of the commissioning client’s and ‘lead consultant’s’ perspectives on power, trust and control – thereby constituting a fundamental indicator of the intended working of that TMO, particularly communications and collaboration. Does the structure promote integration (and, hence teamwork) or fragmentation (and, hence, individualistic opportunism)?

The formal procedures of the TMO are related to its structure and, similarly, are likely to be subject to significant modification in ‘normal’ operation – to yield the informal system of everyday functioning. However, the influences of the formal procedures supplement those of the formal structure for fostering or hampering teamwork.

It is apparent that the entire gamut of research results and advice relating to achieving teams and teamwork concerns recognition of interdependence amongst participants and behaviour accordingly. Inevitably, differences exist and so, coordination and integration must be pursued but that must occur within an overt process of ensuring rewards. Whilst extrinsic rewards are important, it is the intrinsic rewards which are fundamental and underpin enduring teamwork and performance. Thus, it is essential to determine intrinsic rewards which are appropriate to all the participants with regard to their cultural underpinnings of moral values concerning equality, equity and needs.

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